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Approved For Release 2008/10/14 : CIA-RDP80B01495R001300020014-4

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## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

12 April 1974

Office of the Director

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Review of the SIGINT Committee Role and Structure

REFERENCES : a. Memorandum for Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community, dated 4 February 1974

b. Memorandum for Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community (D/DCI/IC), dated 20 February 1974

1. Reference memoranda, copies of which are attached hereto, constitute the initiation and background of a proposal calling for a review of the missions and functions of the SIGINT Committee and for consideration of a restructuring of the Committee and its sub-committees. The Director of Central Intelligence has asked the D/DCI/IC to undertake this review, and I have designated [redacted] to chair an ad hoc review group for this purpose.

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2. Members who wish to participate are requested to designate a senior representative of their organizations as a member of the ad hoc review group to formulate recommendations on this subject to the Director of Central Intelligence.

3. The first meeting of the ad hoc review group will be held on Tuesday, 23 April, at 1000 hours in Room 6E0708, CIA Headquarters Building. By copy of this memorandum, the Chairman of the SIGINT Committee is invited to participate in the ad hoc review group as an observer.

4. Names of representatives should be provided to the USIB Secretariat by COB 19 April 1974 [redacted]

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NSA review completed

NRO Review Completed.

Daniel O. Graham  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Deputy to the DCI for the  
Intelligence Community

Attachments

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Attachment  
USIB-D-27.4/2

**UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD  
SIGINT COMMITTEE**

**OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN**

20 February 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence  
Community (D/DCI/IC)

SUBJECT: Proposed Review of Mission and Functions  
for the SIGINT Committee

1. I have reviewed with special interest the 4 February 1974 proposal of DDS&T and DDI to examine the SIGINT Committee functions and determine how these functions might be conducted more effectively.

2. As Chairman of the SIGINT Committee during the past ten months, I have given considerable thought to the SIGINT Committee, its purposes and role in the Community, the services it can and should perform and how its activities might be conducted more effectively. I am pleased that others are also thinking about these matters. Before I address their thoughts however I would like to offer my own regarding the SIGINT Committee.

3. Why a SIGINT Committee in the first place? Shortly after I assumed the Chair, I visited the participating agencies to seek their views regarding the Committee. Almost unanimously, the top managers with whom I discussed the subject, were in full support of the Committee mechanism. No one is ecstatic about Committees, but all the people whose attitudes I probed, were seized with the need for a forum within the USIB structure in which SIGINT requirements, policy, and problems might be discussed, issues resolved or at the very least, sharply defined. Each participating agency was and to the best of my knowledge, still is persuaded that there should be an arena other than USIB itself, in which all can play an interactive role in dealing with SIGINT matters of concern to them individually and/or collectively.

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4. As one of the principal intelligence disciplines, SIGINT is unique in one important aspect. It happens to have a program manager, namely, the Director, NSA. None of the other intelligence disciplines are similarly "endowed". Yet the Director, NSA, does not "own" the SIGINT business. He "holds" and operates most of the U. S. SIGINT resources "in trust" for the government at large and doing so, is responsible for their effective application in support of total community needs. The community at large wishes to be heard and to contribute on many aspects of those activities for which the Director, NSA, is charged by NSC directive with the principal operating responsibility. As the senior U. S. intelligence principal, the DCI has an overall responsibility to ensure that all intelligence activities are orchestrated for the "common good". There is need for a formal structure through which the DCI can regularly bring his influence to bear on SIGINT activities on behalf of the community and in response to the Presidential charge to assume "overall leadership of the community". I believe the SIGINT Committee to be one of the principal means to accomplish this and further, that it has demonstrated its capability to support the DCI and the customer community equally well.

5. In the recent past, several views regarding possible alternatives to the SIGINT Committee mechanism have surfaced. It has been suggested that a "captive" full-time SIGINT group (rather than a committee) might be appropriate. With the implementation of the NIO concept it was thought that such a group might be established to support the SIGINT functional needs of the various NIOs. In this concept, the SIGINT program manager namely, the Director, NSA, would continue to operate but generally without the policy expressions or guidance developed by a representative community forum like the SIGINT Committee. My impression is that the "captive" group would not be attractive to the community at large because the group would not constitute a mechanism with agency representation in which various SIGINT views could be expressed, deliberated and formalized. As an aside, I should note that although the SIGINT Committee has already performed several tasks in support of the NIOs, its services to the DCI and the community extend well beyond support of the NIO structure.

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6. At one time I believe there were notions that the Intelligence Community Staff might serve as an alternative to the SIGINT Committee. The principal shortcoming of this approach is akin to that found in the "captive" group idea. The IC Staff is in fact in support of the DCI and to the best of my knowledge is not organizationally conceived as a forum in which the individual agencies may express their views, solve problems, and sharpen issues for resolution at the USIB level. A variation of the IC Staff alternative would provide for ad hoc groups or committees to be formed by the IC Staff as needed to address particular tasks/problems. I believe that the IC Staff is currently engaged in several such ad hoc endeavors. This approach has some attraction in that it might partially satisfy community interest in active participation in SIGINT decision-making (to the extent that ad hoc efforts produce the basis for decisions). Ad hoc groups, however, tend to lack continuity, corporate memory and responsibility. On the other hand, a formal committee structure backed by a permanent secretariat can maintain continuity and thereby is most likely to be more consistent in policy and other action matters. The SIGINT Committee like many other committees of USIB has gained acceptance throughout the community as an active authoritative institution with historical roots. I am persuaded that the recognition accorded the SIGINT Committee benefits the national intelligence endeavor by facilitating the expression of policy and guidance to a tightly controlled, fairly monolithic U.S. SIGINT enterprise. It is difficult to imagine how a "captive" or ad hoc group could earn similar stature, vis-a-vis the U.S. SIGINT effort. There is also another important, practical, but sometimes overlooked benefit deriving from community representation on the SIGINT Committee. Each committee member has a responsible position in the organization he represents and can ensure that Committee and Board actions on SIGINT matters are understood and appropriately implemented within the respective agencies. This feature is lacking in any organizational alternative which does not provide for direct community representation.

7. While not defining an organizational solution, (it neither argues for nor against a SIGINT Committee as such) the 4 February proposal seems to present a case for the division of SIGINT responsibilities between the sub-disciplines of SIGINT, namely, COMINT, ELINT, telemetry and perhaps [redacted] Granting that the complexities associated with each of the principal sub-disciplines have increased over the years, it would be

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appropriate to note that the competence of the community and of those individuals selected by their respective agencies to participate in the SIGINT Committee, has broadened during the same period. Many of the technical considerations now brought before the SIGINT Committee might have exceeded the competence of the membership in years past, but I do not believe this is true today. Moreover, in dealing with a particularly complex technical issue, there is hardly any limit to the expertise which can be brought to bear by the combined technical capability of the agencies participating in the SIGINT Committee.

8. In view of the above and despite SIGINT technical complexities, I feel strongly that the SIGINT Committee serving the USIB, serving the individual NIOs and serving the Intelligence Community at large is a satisfactory mechanism. In my opinion, it would be most unfortunate if the comprehensive responsibilities vested in the SIGINT Committee were to be fragmented among separate groups addressing COMINT, ELINT, telemetry, etc. My reasons are:

a. The SIGINT sub-disciplines have become so intertwined and related that attempts to make useful divisions of responsibilities would be awkward and the results unreal. This point is best exemplified by the intermingling of capabilities in the overhead area. Contrary to the view expressed in the 4 February proposal, the various SIGINT sub-disciplines have much more in common - i.e., nature of problems, solutions, etc., than do SIGINT and photography. Moreover, the achievement of trade-offs between SIGINT capabilities is more likely if total capabilities are treated by one authoritative body rather than several.

b. Such a division of responsibilities would probably result in a larger rather than a smaller number of committees. Further, there is bound to be an imbalance in work load between committees. Clearly, COMINT and ELINT matters would demand more Committee attention,

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c. Because of the interrelationships of the sub-disciplines, (particularly the three principal ones) the possibilities for intercommittee conflict are increased. Any coordinating body sitting astride the separate committees would be confronted with a sizeable task in coordinating the efforts of the separate entities and adjudicating the many cross-subdiscipline issues which would inevitably arise.

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Were it to serve as the coordinator of these separate entities, much of the SIGINT Committee's present utility would be diminished by virtue of the need to devote a large amount of its time to the resolution of issues between the subordinate elements. I have attached a listing of SIGINT Committee actions for the 1972-73 period. The list represents a numerical tally by subject and does not necessarily represent the amount of effort devoted to each functional category or individual subject. As an example, the USIB Guidance for the National Reconnaissance SIGINT Program requires a great deal of attention to all areas of SIGINT.

d. Staffing the sub-discipline oriented Committees with "experts" competent in their respective areas would place an extraordinary personnel demand on the participating agencies. State and Treasury would be extremely hard-pressed to provide more and different representation than they have at present. Were separate sub-discipline committees established it is quite possible that a number of agencies would find it necessary to use the same individuals on several committees.

8. By way of closing thoughts, I think that the SIGINT Committee has performed a useful role in the past and can do so in the future. I recommend we stay with it and not tackle community SIGINT matters on a sub-discipline basis. Like all organizational mechanisms it can be improved. As a starter, I suggest that we might redo the subcommittee structure as follows. Redesignate SORS as the SIGINT Applications Subcommittee (SAS) and charge it with most of the present SORS functions

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Consolidate the Intelligence Guidance Subcommittee (IGS) and the SIGINT Evaluation Subcommittee (SES) into one entity designated the SIGINT Requirements and Evaluation Subcommittee. The latter would be responsible for a U.S. SIGINT requirements and evaluation system. It would also take on all special SIGINT evaluation studies including those previously conducted by SORS. These are but sketchy ideas which I will be happy to flesh out.

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Chairman

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(Series B)

Memorandum for Holders  
USIB-SC-4.2/65  
4 March 1974

SIGINT COMMITTEE

of the

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR HOLDERS OF USIB-SC-4.2/65

Subject: Proposed Review of Mission and Functions  
of the SIGINT Committee

Reference: USIB-SC-4.2/65, [ ] 28 February 1974  
(Memorandum for SIGINT Committee Principals)

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The CIA Member of the SIGINT Committee has requested that the attached memorandum from Messrs Duckett and Proctor be circulated to SIGINT Committee Principals for information. This memorandum is the initial proposal for review of the mission and functions of the SIGINT Committee to which [ ] provided comments (reference).

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[ ]  
Executive Secretary

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Attachment  
Memorandum for Holders  
USIP-SC-4,2/65 -

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4 MARCH 1974

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community

**SUBJECT :** Proposed Review of Mission and Functions of the SIGINT Committee

1. This memorandum requests that you sponsor a review of the SIGINT Committee functions to develop recommendations as to how these functions might be conducted more effectively.

2. Over the years the SIGINT Committee has accumulated a considerable variety of responsibilities pertaining to COMINT, ELINT and Telemetry, [redacted]

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[redacted] Concurrent with this accumulation of responsibilities, there have been significant changes in the number and sophistication of target signals and in the complexity of collection techniques and systems. Thus, the focus traditionally given by the Committee to COMINT has had to be expanded to accommodate the increasing and competing importance of ELINT and Telemetry as [redacted]

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[redacted] Added to this environment, there has been growing pressure on the Committee to assume additional responsibilities in the areas of policing the responsiveness of collection systems to community guidance, insuring expeditious processing and prompt transmission of data to the users, assessing the intelligence value of collected material, and identifying options, mixes and trade-offs,

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3. We believe that the present organization of the SIGINT Committee forces too few people to assume responsibilities for too many diverse activities to expect them to meet satisfactorily all of these present requirements. For example, SORS, one of the SIGINT Committee's major subcommittees, has the responsibility for overseeing activities associated with COMINT, ELINT, Telemetry, [REDACTED]

too broad a range of disciplines and user interests to be handled adequately by a single group of people. At the same time, there is no entity short of the Committee as a whole to deal with the most crucial question of system trade-off in each one of the areas, e.g., satellite versus ground-based or airborne collection.

4. We therefore believe that there should be a review and reorganization of USIB mechanisms to deal with COMINT, ELINT, Telemetry [REDACTED] The review should take into consideration the following factors:

- a. Any new arrangement should insure that the body responsible for each discipline -- COMINT, ELINT, Telemetry, [REDACTED] -- is staffed by people competent and interested in that particular discipline.
- b. In each of the areas, the reorganized USIB mechanism should be able to perform at least the following functions:
  - develop and maintain intelligence guidance and supplemental requirements for use of program managers and operators, to include tasking guidance where appropriate;
  - assess collection effectiveness and the intelligence value of collection operations;

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Memorandum for Holders

USIB-SC-4.2/65

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- identify options, mixes and trade-offs among capabilities associated within its discipline.
- c. It is more important to provide mechanisms to administer coherently all the activities associated with each of the separate areas than it is to have all of COMINT, ELINT and Telemetry administered by a single committee. From the standpoint of intelligence value, ultimate use of data, and techniques of processing and analysis, the relationship between COMINT, ELINT and Telemetry is no closer than that between those three areas and photographic intelligence. Yet within each area there are important trade-offs to be made among ground-based, airborne and satellite collectors; and new organizations should be arranged with these objectives in mind.
- d. At the same time, some mechanism for close coordination must be provided between those who administer COMINT, ELINT, Telemetry  since many collection systems collect data in all areas and must be tasked in a coordinated way.

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5. We believe it important to address this problem soon and in a manner which involves the participation of the major production and collection activities of the community. Accordingly, we request you convene a meeting of the leaders of appropriate production and collection activities to initiate this review.

/s/

/s/

CARL E. DUCKETT  
Deputy Director  
for  
Science and Technology

EDWARD W. PROCTOR  
Deputy Director for Intelligence

4 February 1974

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